A Comparison of the Impact of
Protective and
Preservative
Video Surveillance on Urban
Territoriality: the Case of Switzerland
Francisco Klauser
1
Abstract
This paper focuses on a comparison between two forms of video-surveillance and their consequences for the
territoriality of public space users: the
preservative, which aims to preserve public order and to prevent ‘antisocial’
behaviour; and the
protective, which protect specific risk-points like buildings or objects. The
fundamental difference between preservative and protective surveillance is linked to the spatial logic of its
functioning, that can be deduced both from the position of the cameras and the general orientation of its
view. Following Lefebvre and Raffestin, it argues that these socio-spatial relationships of social players may
be considered as an inherent part of public space. In consequence, their transformation directly affects the
qualities of public space. These theoretical explored are illustrated with a cartographical study of the cameras
within the city centre of Geneva and a study of public sensitivity and perception of video surveillance in the
Swiss city of Olten.
Introduction
The expansion of video-surveillance is often considered to be part of a general explosion of
information and communication technology. Even if cameras are not the only surveillance devices
proliferating in our cities (Brin, 1998: 6) they are often seen to be the tip of the iceberg built by
relatively new surveillance and security technologies. While video-surveillance may be praised
“as paving the way to a better future” by companies specialising in security technology
(Videotronic, 2003) and as improving security within public space on the one hand, it might on
the other hand raise important concerns about the protection of privacy and potential social
exclusion.
Quite often, this controversial discussion about positive and negative consequences of videosurveillance
also occurs within research projects that examine issues of video-surveillance. Thus,
video-surveillance is often analysed in terms of statistically measured levels of fear of crime or of
rates of criminality, an approach focussing mainly on matters concerning the security problems
1
Institut de Géographie, Université de Fribourg, Switzerland. mailto:francisco.klauser@unifr.ch
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of city centres. (Honess and Charman, 1992; Brown, 1995; Fyfe and Bannister, 1996)
Furthermore, there has been much work on the consequences of video-surveillance concerning a
new relationship of power between the watcher and the watched that may fundamentally alter
the nature of social interaction within public space. In addition to this vision of video-surveillance
as an instrument of power in a foucauldian sense, the sociological response to the general issue
of video-surveillance has been dominated by images of the Panopticon, as David Lyon has
pointed out. (Lyon, 1994; Mc Cahill, 1998; Gandy, 1998; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000) In
consequence, the main interest of many studies has been directed at large-scale publicly or
privately owned CCTV security systems, that I will call
preservative-surveillance (lat.
preservare = maintain) because of its extensive and wide ranging objective to preserve public
order and to prevent ‘anti-social’ behaviour. However the majority of surveillance cameras that
are focused on public space are not really meant to preserve public order in a whole but to
protect specific risk-points like particular buildings or objects. In opposition to
preservativesurveillance,
this second CCTV category will be called
protective-surveillance (lat. protegere
= to cover before, from). As I will argue, the fundamental difference between
preservative and
protective
surveillance is linked to the spatial logic of its functioning, that can be deduced both
from the position of the cameras and the general orientation of its view.
Thus, this present article focuses mainly on a comparison between these two forms of videosurveillance,
and on its consequences for the
territoriality of public space users. As Claude
Raffestin points out, the concept of territoriality must be understood as a complex of
relationships linking a population, group or individual to their social and spatial environment
(Raffestin, 1984: 140). Within the theoretical introduction of this article I shall argue that these
socio-spatial relationships of social players may be considered as an inherent part of public
space. In consequence, their transformation directly affects the qualities of public space. In the
second part of the paper, a cartographical representation of the cameras within the city centre of
Geneva will illustrate the general spatial distribution of video-surveillance cameras. On this basis,
different spatial concepts of surveillance will be examined – related to protective and
preservative surveillance - in order to give more depth to the analysis of the effects of videosurveillance
concerning the territoriality of public space users. Thirdly, the public sensitivity and
perception of these two categories will be compared on the basis of research results for the
Swiss city called Olten. Situated on the national north-south/east-west railroad and motorway
intersection, Olten currently encounters various social problems because of its centrality (e.g.:
drug dealing and prostitution). Because of the specific circumstances of police video-surveillance
of street prostitution, public opinion about video-surveillance is especially interesting to study
within this urban context. The Olten case study also seems to clearly illustrate the “struggle for
space” between different social players and interests.
On a methodological level this article combines two empirical studies of video-surveillance that
focus on two different Swiss cities. On the one hand, the spatial distribution of video-surveillance
will be illustrated by the study of the city centre of Geneva that was done in summer 2001. On
the other hand, the analysis of public perception of different types of video-surveillance is based
on a postal public opinion poll for the city of Olten (summer 2003).
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The theoretical approach of this work
The general theoretical approach of this work is focused mainly on the concept of
territoriality
in order to understand the changing relationship between social players and public space
because of video-surveillance. In view of the examination of the socio-spatial effects produced
by video-surveillance, the general conception of public space will be presented and related to the
concept of territoriality in the following section.
Within this article, public space is not only conceived from the perspective of its material form
but also of the social processes that produced it. Consequently, in order to understand the
qualities of public spaces, different social and physical levels must be taken into account. These
levels must be understood as interactive and fundamentally interrelated. It is therefore necessary
to consider not only the material and architectural structure of public space but also its social use
and significance.
Thus, public space can be considered as socially ‘significant space’ that consists of signifiers
(symbol), and signified (meaning). According to Raffestin, public space may be seen as public
territory that results from collective and/or individual processes of spatial appropriation by action
and representation. This appropriated space - as the object of collective intentions – takes part
in reciprocal relationships with society: on the one hand, space is produced by the society and its
inherent interactions of power. Therefore, public space cannot be an objective and neutral entity,
but a socially produced socio-spatial reality. On the other hand, space produces society.
According to the French philosopher Henry Levèbvre, a decisive part is played by space in the
continuous reproduction of society (1968).
As a first approximation, public space may be defined as “open, publicly accessible places
where people go for group or individual activities” (Carr et al., 1992: 50). The central element of
this definition of public space is its openness to social activities and use. On this theoretical basis,
public space is conceived as democratically shared space that is characterised by its individual
and collective users. Nevertheless, the history of public space can also be written as the history
of its social regulation and socially defined use. Historical and contemporary studies have shown
that not every public space is open to everybody, but very often, specific groups take control of
specific public space and its use (Davis, 1999).
Not only the general access but also general qualities of public space in terms of social use,
sociability and social control depend directly on the presence of its social users. To think of
public space without its users and their relationships would be a limitation of its complex
qualities. The concept of social players is therefore necessary, not only to “create” space but to
constitute elements of space (Löw, 2001: 155).
In this sense, the qualities of public space depend on the presence (or absence) of social players,
but also, crucially, on the relationships and interactions between them. In order to understand
public space as lived and perceived space, it is therefore necessary to analyse both the
relationship between social players related by public space, and their relationship with their
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physical environment. This leads to the concept of
territoriality that is defined by Raffestin as a
“system of relationships of a population or an individual with the outside world, and their
modification by means of mediators” (Raffestin, 1984)
.
Two fundamental dimensions can be considered within this definition in strictly relational terms.
On the one hand, territoriality includes the relational spectrum of individual or collective social
players to their physical and social environment. On the other hand, territoriality is fundamentally
based on the concept of mediators. As Raffestin has argued, every relationship of social players
presupposes a mediation, which involves concrete or abstract instruments (means) of varying
nature. For example, knowledge, language and behaviour can be seen as mediators, in that they
affect relationships crucially. While mediators make relationships possible, they also influence
and limit them. In addition, “mediators can be seen as constituting the conditions for the exercise
of power, and they therefore define quite precisely the limits to liberty or autonomy of those who
use them in their relationships with the exteriority [outside world]” (Raffestin, 1984: 141).
In the following analytical part of this article, I will consider CCTV as a material and symbolic
mediator that changes interpersonal social relationships between the watched and the watcher as
well as their relationship to public space. Furthermore, CCTV will be examined as an instrument
that allows symbolic and material appropriatio n of space and changes the qualities of surveyed
places.
Case Study: Geneva
In summer 2001, over 270 surveillance cameras were discovered by personal observation in
public streets and squares in the city centre of Geneva. (Within this study, only open “outdoor”
public space was taken into account. This means streets, squares, pavements etc.) On this basis,
it has become possible to illustrate the spatial distribution of video-surveillance, the typical
categories of its users and the various objectives related to video-surveillance. On the basis of
these results, various categories of visible video-surveillance of public space can be established
(Klauser, 2001). Since there is no room here to discuss all the various forms of CCTV in detail,
I will concentrate on two major categories of video-surveillance.
Where does video- surveillance occur?
Concerning spatial distribution of surveillance cameras, an important correspondence with the
functional character of space can be seen. Concentrations of video-surveillance are mainly
situated in areas with large numbers of banks, luxury hotels and international institutions along the
north side of the lake as well as south of the outflow of the lake. It is interesting to note the
absence of video-surveillance in the old-town of Geneva, which can be explained by the absence
of banks and international luxury commerce (shops selling jewellery, watches, art or fashion).
This finding illustrates the absence of outdoor video-surveillance of small, independent luxury
shops until now in Geneva. There are also few outdoor cameras to be found within the red light
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district bordering the railway station
2, as well as in the residential area in the south-eastern part
near to the lake.
As well as indicating the private control of public space, this general review of video-surveillance
distribution also illustrates varying degrees of social appropriation of the surveillance technology
between international and national shops and institutions, as well as between different
commercial specialities.
Cameras Proportion
Financial institutions
105 37.9%
Public institutions
59 21.3%
Hotels, Restaurants, Nightclubs
45 16.2%
Fashion shops
11 4.0%
Others
57 20.6%
Total
277 100%
Table 1:
Users of video-surveillance
Geneva 2001, N=277
Motives for video-surveillance
A possible distinction amongst video-surveillance users would concern their public or private
nature. As with other empirical research and cartographical representations of video-surveillance
cameras, most of the cameras that have been found in Geneva belong to private institutions.
However, some public institutions have also been found to use surveillance cameras in order to
control public space in Geneva. At the same time, the reasons for installation as well as the
general form of surveillance seem to be similar across most public and private systems in
Geneva. The cameras are not organised in order to have the best view of public space, but their
position follows the need for specific protection of buildings, financial capital or objects. This
category of video-surveillance forms a contrast to large-scale CCTV systems that aim to cover
extended urban areas. Regarding the spatial consequences of video-surveillance, it therefore
seems relevant to differentiate not only owners but also objectives of surveillance.
On the one hand, a purely protection-oriented objective can be identified (
protective
surveillance
), while on the other hand a behavioural improvement target (preservative
surveillance
) is indicated. Both types of video-surveillance can be seen in both private and
public use. The fundamental difference between
protective and preservative surveillance
concerns the spatial concept of its functioning, which can be deduced both from the installation
point of the cameras and the general orientation of their view.
Protective surveillance
More than 90 percent of the cameras detected in Geneva are fixed on private buildings in order
to watch specific parts of the adjoining public street or pavement. The analysis of the field of
vision of these cameras illustrates their very limited utility.
2
In Zurich, many more cameras have been found in the red-light district by Müller and Boos (2003).
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Firstly, the general view of the camera is defined by its installation. As the cameras are fixed on
private buildings, public space and its users are really watched from a private point of view
situated on the edge of public space. This decentralised and often immobile view – there are
very few cameras of this type that can be manipulated by security operators - affects the
possible selection of visual information. Secondly, the position and angles of the camera
determine the geographic scale of surveillance. In the case of
protective surveillance, the
camera’s position is likely to be quite vertical, in order to concentrate on one specific spatial
point of risk. On the basis of these observations, the general aim of
protective surveillance is
the safeguarding of private property (objects, buildings and financial capital) from dangers
coming from the adjoining public space. Therefore, very often,
protective surveillance focuses
on spatial points with easy access to private space, like shop windows or entrance doors.
Most of the cameras owned by public institutions that have been found in Geneva city centre
also belong to this surveillance-category (examples include consulates, police stations and power
stations). Again, the cameras do not cover the street for its own sake, but for the purpose of the
protection of specific spatial risk points. Therefore, in contrast to
preservative surveillance, the
reason for
protective surveillance is not the control of public streets or squares as an end in
itself but the protection of public or private property. This general surveillance objective also
limits the social processes of selection, evaluation and recording of the transmitted visual
information. As there are no possible movements of the camera (modification of the position or
zoom) the relationship between the watcher and public space users is therefore reduced to a
privately defined minimum.
This selective surveillance of certain ‘spatial points’ may also be enlarged to ‘spatial lines’. In this
case, the visual protection might cover not only a specific point of interest like an entrance door,
but the whole outer wall of the building. In consequence, the camera’s position is often more
horizontal in order to enlarge the surveyed portion of the space. Again, the cameras are not
meant to control behaviour and social norms in public space as a whole, but only in relation to
the owner’s individually defined needs. Therefore, the key feature of CCTV as a normative and
preservative measure, to generally modify people’s behaviour, is much more limited in
preservative surveillance
.
People are only watched if they enter the surveyed part of the space. Their behaviour is
exclusively of interest during their stay within sight of the camera. Therefore, this type of
surveillance is not really focused on people but on parts of public space that are bordering
private property. “The prime function of surveillance in the contemporary era is border control.
We do not care who is out there or what they are doing. We want to see only those who are
entitled to enter” (Boyne, 2000). The aim is not to discipline individuals as in Bentham’s
Panopticon, but to discipline the border between private and public space. There is no need to
change the soul of the watched, but to guarantee an economic benefit for specific parts of public
space. As there is mainly an individual and private benefit from these cameras, the risk of
neglecting or displacing crime to poorer urban areas is not taken into account by such private
camera operators.
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Preservative surveillance
In contrast with
protective surveillance, preservative surveillance aims to control and
normalise public space on a large scale. While the former controls individually defined spatial
points, the latter focuses on larger ‘spatial surfaces’. The main difference between these two
categories of surveillance concerns therefore its geographic scale and spatial concept.
Preservative surveillance
not only tries to protect specific spatial points of risk, but also to
monitor risks that are deployed within extensive areas (November, Klauser, Ruegg, 2002).
Examples include vandalism in city centres or other deviant social behaviour that does not only
concern one specific spatial point. For this reason,
preservative surveillance generally uses a
large network of pan tilt and zoom cameras. Because preservative surveillance often aims to
follow individuals within the watched space, the position of the cameras is organised in order to
maximise the extent of the observed space. Therefore, preservative surveillance systems are also
more flexible. On the one hand, the organisation of the whole system can often be improved in
order to eliminate blind spots or other technical difficulties. (November, Ruegg, Klauser, 2003)
On the other hand, the security staff are often able to manipulate the position and focus of the
cameras.
Even if many
preservative surveillance systems are used by public authorities, private videosurveillance
in shopping malls often applies very similar forms and spatial concepts of control. In
both contexts video-surveillance is intended to improve the quality of social relationships and to
create safe and risk-free (public) space. In addition, as Reeve has pointed out (1998), there is
some resemblance between present-day development of city centres and shopping malls. While
on the one hand shopping malls are often replacing traditional open public space in terms of
public sociability (Davis, 1999; Carr et al., 1992; Valentine, 1996; Rauterberg, 2001) town
centres are becoming increasingly focused on leisure and private interests that are monitored by
video-surveillance (Reeve, 1998: 83).
There have actually been many studies about
preservative surveillance in publicly or privately
owned space. In consequence, in the following section, I will focus on
protective surveillance
and its implications for publicly owned public space. Nevertheless, in the last part of the article,
public perception of
protective and preservative surveillance will be compared.
Protective video-surveillance and its implications for public space
Although, as I have argued, there are very few studies about the consequences of
protective
surveillance
cameras, their rapid social and spatial expansion makes the analysis of their
implications for public space very important.
First,
protective video-surveillance allows its owners to widen their capacity to control public
space. The ‘territory of influence’ of particular private or public players is extended into public
space. Although there are very few studies about security staff interventions related to privately
owned surveillance cameras that are watching parts of public space, there seem to be various
types of reactions. Often, the real time monitoring of the images, as well as the measures taken in
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the case of observed misbehaviour, depend directly on the work done by the security staff
(Norris, Armstrong, 1997). Performances by the Australian artist Denis Beaubois in Sydney’s
public squares consisted simply of staying motionless in direct view of surveillance cameras with
his eyes fixed on the camera. According to Beaubois, very often this performance sooner or later
provoked some sort of response:
“Sometimes it was so swift that Beaubois was escorted off the public premises
only minutes after his arrival, the explanation being that he was disturbing the
peace, or lacked a permit, or some equally inconsequential – and symptomatic –
bureaucratic banality. On other occasions, where his stoic performances were
graciously (even if often uncomprehendingly) tolerated by the authorities, it was
the passers-by who became engaged by his presence, stopping to stare and
enquire what exactly was going on.”
(Levin, 2001: 81)
Similar observations have been made by the New York Surveillance Camera Players that stage
theatre performances in front of public or private cameras. Comments put on the Internet about
the course of events during their performances also illustrate the rapid and often violent reaction
to behaviour which is conceived as ‘deviant’ (New York Camera Players, 2003).
As these examples show, there are various possible ways in which private camera users can
intervene within public space. In addition, current trends in technical development leading to the
construction of automated systems capable of recognizing people or incidents may widen the
possibilities of private control and surveillance of public space. In this sense, private usage of
public space for the purpose of commercial exploitation can be reinforced by its visual control.
As a result, private protection surveillance enables private players to control the exploitation of
public space.
According to the map of Geneva, some parts of public space in urban areas are closely
monitored by private surveillance systems. As mentioned before, there is a very clear relationship
between spatial density of financial institutions in particular and the spatial distribution of private
video-surveillance. While the map of video-surveillance in Geneva illustrates the functional
qualities of different parts of urban space, this unequal coverage of surveillance cameras can also
reinforce the hierarchical organisation and fragmentation of urban public space. As a result,
private video-surveillance may allow the reduction of public disorder within city centres,
combined with the commercially motivated attraction of beneficial objects and people:
“Within this discourse CCTV cameras can be understood as helping to create
public spaces for “free”, “responsible”, consumer-oriented individuals who
independently choose their autonomous role in the life of the city. Thus CCTV is
constructed around the idea of “empowerment” and “freedom”, particularly the
“freedom and safety to shop.”
(Coleman and Sim, 2000: 635)
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Although the implications connected with video-surveillance of marginal social groups are not yet
fully understood, the increasing spatial predominance of private surveillance cameras raises
questions about increasing tendencies of privatisation and commercialisation of city centres.
From this point of view, it would be of interest to study the everyday spatial practices of marginal
groups in city centres closely monitored by private systems.
Video-surveillance as access control
Access control constitutes a particular case of
protective surveillance. With regard to the
general spatial concept of
protective surveillance (the protection of specific spatial points of
risk) an additional dimension is related to access control: the control of flows (of people and
objects) between publicly and privately owned space.
As already mentioned, there are many private cameras that are watching public space in front of
shop entrances. While these shops are basically open to customers, they are not accessible to
everybody. The privately owned commercialised indoor space is generally limited to
‘economically interesting’ people (Schubert, 2000: 39). In this context, video-surveillance plays
the role of a symbolic and physical mediator that communicates (symbolically) and enables
(physically) the control and limitation of access. The video-monitored border between publicly
and privately owned parts of the territory creates a relational stability between accessible and
non-accessible places.
The automatic face recognition system at Zurich ‘Unique Airport’ is probably one of the purest
examples of access control related to video-surveillance. According to statements of security
officers, the automatic scan of passengers’ faces is intended to enable the identification of
already known illegal immigrants (Elsener, 10.1.2003: 3). In this particular case, access
restriction is clearly related to the cameras’ capacity to recognize people whose facial
characteristics have already been scanned and recorded. However, access control within urban
space may not only depend on the recognition of known individuals, but more generally on their
physical appearance. Furthermore, restrictions to access private space are often extended to the
adjoining public space (Simon, 2001).
In addition, public places like streets or squares can only be understood in relation to other
publicly accessible (but privately owned) places. Particular localities do not exist in an isolated
manner but as part of a complex system and network of localities (Huet, 1992: 18). As a result,
restricted possibilities of access to certain parts of the network of localities will not only affect the
qualities of the privately owned places but also of the remaining open space. The regulation of
flows between private (inside) and public (outside) space will therefore also change the latter’s
qualities. According to Mats Franzen,
there is a constant negotiation between the anonymous public of a place and the
activities bordering it. Consequently, the urban order in a particular place is
determined, at least partially, by the unintended, and cumulative, consequence of
all border controls. From a power point of view this is interesting. All activities
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operating “from the inside“ are organized from the beginning, pursuing their own
interests, while no one has any direct responsibility for “the outside“, the urban
order, except the police.
(Franzén, 2001: 206)
The most perceptible consequence of access control concerns the territoriality of groups or
individuals that do not have permission to pass. The interdiction to enter (generally) accessible
places not only limits their relational spectrum to other social players but also their relation to the
city in terms of daily spatial practices. Furthermore, attitudes toward the city will be different for
people that may not be welcome to cross the border between publicly owned and privately
owned publicly accessible space.
Social acceptance of private video-surveillance of public space
Although private
protective surveillance may therefore influence the perception and use of city
space, at least in Switzerland, there is no public political or legal discussion about the
appropriateness of these protection measures.
In order to deepen the understanding of privately owned and used (
protective) videosurveillance
within public space, some specific research results from a postal public opinion poll
for the city of Olten will be used
3. This preliminary study will raise elements of response and
indicate further lines of research in order to understand the social perception of videosurveillance.
As the main purpose of this article is to examine protective video-surveillance in
comparison with preservative surveillance, the Olten case is particularly interesting, because it
includes several forms of public conservation and private protection CCTV systems. I will
therefore discuss questions concerning the awareness and acceptance of both public and private
video-surveillance systems. Besides this quantitative approach, qualitative research will certainly
be necessary in order to deepen the general understanding of video-surveillance.
At the beginning of 2001, the installation of a CCTV system in Olten – a small city of about
17,000 inhabitants – caused a lot of national and international media interest. Although two
pedestrian subways within the city as well as the railway station have been video-monitored by
the police for several years, German and Swiss television teams suddenly appeared in this city,
located in the centre of Switzerland at the hub of the north-south and east-west road and railway
routes, in order to have a look at the new CCTV system. This general attention was mainly
motivated by the character of the street called ‘Industriestrasse’ that was considered to be the
biggest centre of street prostitution in Switzerland. At present three dome-cameras are located
along the 1.2 kilometre long streetwalking area. The data is transferred by a public network of
optical fibres laid underground. This arrangement was mainly to facilitate the possible expansion
3
In a three-part questionnaire people were asked what they did in public space, their general perception of
video-surveillance and their specific opinion concerning the surveillance of street prostitution in Olten. On
the basis of 5621 original addresses, 1500 people were chosen according to their age structure.
Unfortunately the original data basis did not contain a gender parameter. As a result, the gender balance
within the 478 responses (31.9%) varies considerably (62% men, 38% women), while the age structure is
relatively even. Numbers of responses per age-category (10 years) vary between 89 and 111 (18.3 % - 22.8
%).
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of the system. The equipment for viewing and recording the transmitted information is located in
the municipal police headquarters. In spite of the real-time screening of the transmitted
information, there is no active observation of the material. However, as the policemen on duty
explained, the images are sometimes consulted before going out on patrol.
Public awareness of video-surveillance
Surveillance cameras are often considered to be strongly symbolic features. In order to increase
the preventive effects of video-surveillance, the visibility of the cameras is often consciously
reinforced by large signs and/or media campaigns. On this basis, video-surveillance is often seen
as a symbolic mediator that may change the behaviour of possible delinquents. However,
concerning the everyday use of public space, many studies suggest that there may be very little
public awareness of surveillance cameras (Klocke, 2001). The Olten study partially confirms this
general finding. Within the questionnaire, people were asked to indicate general areas where they
were aware of surveillance cameras in Olten:
Where do you know about CCTV?
Public square 0%
Schools 0%
Children's playground 0%
Restaurant 1%
Car park 21%
Shops 21%
Shopping malls 34%
Railway station 42%
Street 45%
Bank 51%
Pedestrian subway 52%
Table 2:
Public awareness of video-surveillance
Olten 2003, N=487
Secondly, people were asked to give, if possible, specific examples of places equipped with
surveillance cameras within the general areas. From these two questions, two main conclusions
can be drawn:
1. Awareness is much greater in relation to public (preservative) cameras than in relation to
private (protective) surveillance. Although many people think that there are cameras
installed in banks, almost no specific examples were given. The same applies to shops
and shopping malls. Therefore, it appears that in regard to the inside of shops, banks etc.
people often
assume the presence of cameras, but they do not really know about them.
Beside that, no specific example was given for outdoor private (protective) cameras
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although there are several examples in Olten. In contrast, people were very well
informed about most of the publicly used
preservative cameras.
2. However, public awareness is not the same for all places of public surveillance. Three
publicly used video-surveillance systems were mentioned very frequently: the railway
station (105 mentions = 21 % of all returned questionnaires), the street prostitution (186
= 38%), and the pedestrian subway near the railway station called ‘Winkel’ (125 =
26%). Another publicly monitored pedestrian subway within the city centre (called
‘Citypassage’) was almost forgotten (3 = 0.6 %).
First of all, the awareness of surveillance of street prostitution seems to be influenced by the
great media interest. Secondly, in regard to the other places of public video-surveillance, unequal
awareness seems to be influenced by the perception of social risk related to the place. Actually,
people were also asked to freely indicate places where they do not feel secure in Olten. While
the railway station (147 responses) and the ‘Winkel’ pedestrian subway (82 responses) are by
far the most feared places, the ‘City-passage’ was mentioned only 8 times.
On this basis, a plausible hypothesis to explain public awareness of video-surveillance would
concern the personal perception of insecurity and risk within different places. At the same time,
the degree of personal concern may also be an explanation for the very poor knowledge of
private
protective surveillance. People think that banks, shopping malls and shops are very
often monitored by CCTV, but they do not
know exactly which ones are, because it does not
mean anything to them personally.
Public acceptance of video-surveillance
The general finding that public video-surveillance has a high level of public support (for example
Ditton, Short, 1998) can be confirmed by the Olten study. For example, more than 60% of all
participants agree with the statement “those who have nothing to hide should not be afraid of
CCTV”, while only 18% disagree. However, regarding the Olten study, different factors seem to
influence public opinion concerning video-surveillance. Firstly, the acceptance of videosurveillance
seems to be influenced by the type and nature of the monitored place. In general,
people are more likely to accept CCTV within functional places like car parks and pedestrian
subways than in residential areas and public squares. The social relationship with space, that is a
fundamental part of the concept of territoriality, seems therefore decisive in order to understand
public acceptance of video-surveillance. Monitoring is less acceptable in places that are seen as
belo nging to the personal sphere, such as residential neighbourhoods. Moreover in spaces,
which are designed to encourage sociability and the display of personal relationships, such as
public squares, monitoring is also less acceptable. Finally, it would appear that work is
considered by the vast majority of respondents as parts of the personal, not the public sphere
and thus an inappropriate space for video-surveillance.
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Where does videosurveillance disturb you?
Disturbing Neutral Not Disturbing No answer
Car parking
1% 4% 86% 8%
Pedestrian subway
3% 6% 84% 8%
Railway station
3% 7% 77% 14%
Bank
5% 11% 76% 8%
Shopping mall
6% 17% 69% 8%
Luxury business (Inside)
10% 11% 64% 15%
Clothing shops (Inside)
12% 12% 62% 15%
Public transport
14% 23% 57% 6%
Children's playground
16% 18% 57% 9%
Public square
18% 18% 47% 16%
Residential Neighbourhood
31% 19% 37% 13%
Place of Work
66% 15% 15% 5%
Table 3:
Public acceptance of videosurveillance
Olten 2003, N=487
In addition to the acceptance of visual surveillance according to the type of space involved,
public opinion also differs with regard to private or public surveillance of public space. In fact,
while public support for police surveillance is generally high, private (protective) cameras are
regarded much more critically by the public. 47.6 % of the answers wanted private institutions to
avoid video-surveillance of public space, while only 26.8 % were in favour. In this sense public
acceptance of video-surveillance also seems to be motivated by its direct personal benefit.
Private video-surveillance focussing on public streets
and pavements should be avoided
Absolutely correct
20.8%
Correct
27.0%
Neutral
19.3%
Not true
19.1%
Not true at all
7.2%
Do not know
4.9%
No Answer
1.6%
Table 4: The critical view of private video-surveillance
Olten 2003, N=487
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Conclusion
The general aim of this article has been to analyse two forms of video-surveillance concerning
their socio-spatial consequences for the territoriality of public space users. For this purpose, the
analysis of spatial distribution of surveillance cameras in Geneva has been used in order to point
out the general trend of private
protective surveillance of public space such as streets,
pavements and squares. Although this type of video-surveillance does not focus on behaviour
within public space as a whole but on the protection of particular spatial risk-points, it has been
argued that it may reinforce private control and influence on urban space by regulating flows
between publicly and privately owned space. Autonomous choices concerning spatial activities
within public space may be limited.
Concerning the concept of territoriality, the empirical findings have opened the way to
investigation of possible effects on the relationship between different types of public space users
on the one hand, and social players and the physical environment on the other. At the same time,
the results of the Olten public opinion poll have shown that existing socio-spatial relationships
with public space may also influence the general acceptance of surveillance measures. Videosurveillance
may therefore not only change the territoriality of public space users, but also
depend on it. Furthermore, it has been argued that public awareness of video-surveillance
depends on the spatial concept of surveillance on the one hand, and on the personal concern
about the surveillance measures on the other.
Regarding the low rate of public awareness concerning especially private
protective
surveillance
that has been found, raises the question about the increasing risk to be mistaken
about daily surveillance of one’s practices within public space. According to Rössler, personal
autonomy is also threatened if people are genuinely mistaken about the possibility that other
people have information about them (Rössler, 2001: 233). From the point of view of monitored
individuals within public places, the “disturbance in the relation between self and surrounding
territory” (Olalquiaga, 1992 in Soja, 1996: 198), that Edward Soja notes regarding geographical
experience of postmodernity in general, linked with “the growing incapacity of our minds to
cognitively map not just the city but also the great global multinational and decentered
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual subjects” (Jameson,
1992 in Soja, 1996: 199) may therefore also be seen in connection to CCTV. In this sense, the
consequences of video-surveillance on urban territoriality do not only concern access restrictions
or increased use of places that are perceived to be safer because of surveillance cameras, but,
more generally, the more far reaching relation between society and city space as a whole. This
also leads to the question in what way security measures like CCTV may indeed transform the
very society they are only designed to protect.
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